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INTRODUCTION 
More than a decade ago, Rolando Stockton rejected a plea bargain that 
came with a ten-year prison sentence, opting instead to take his chances at 
trial.1 The trial went badly. After being found guilty on several drug and 
firearm charges, Stockton received a forty-year prison sentence.2 From an 
objective point of view, Stockton should have taken the deal; rejecting it 
cost him thirty years of freedom. In postconviction proceedings, Stockton 
proffered a reason for his poor judgment: his lawyer failed to disclose to 
him the maximum sentence he faced at trial and the advantages of the ten-
year deal.3 In spite of his admittedly hazy memory of the events, the lawyer 
disagreed, claiming he told Stockton that the plea deal was a “good offer.”4 
Without clear evidence, the reviewing court sided with Stockton’s lawyer.5 
On that finding, Stockton lost his claim, and he is still serving his initial 
sentence today.6  
 
1 United States v. Stockton, No. 99-0352, 2012 WL 2675240, at *4 (D. Md. July 5, 2012). 
2 Id. at *1. 
3 Id. at *4. 
4 Id. at *10. 
5 Id. at *9, *11 (holding that, at the very least, Stockton’s lawyer did not misadvise Stockton 
about the maximum sentence he faced at trial and that he adequately presented the terms of the 
plea deal to Stockton).  
6 Id. at *14. 
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Under the recent Supreme Court decisions in Lafler v. Cooper7 and Mis-
souri v. Frye8, defense counsel has a duty to inform and reasonably advise 
clients about plea offers from the prosecution, so that defendants do not 
forego favorable plea bargains due to the ineffective assistance of their 
counsel. Yet the story above demonstrates a fundamental problem with 
these new duties: the lack of a record of the plea bargaining process makes 
them unenforceable. Without such a record, the defendants, who bear the 
burden of proof in Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims,9 have no evidence to support claims of defective advice. Their hopes 
thus rest on the cooperation of the very lawyers they accuse of being 
ineffective. When combined with the other difficulties inherent in establish-
ing an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this problem renders the new 
right toothless. 
In this Comment, I propose that the criminal defense bar adopt a prac-
tice of recording the plea bargaining process in order to better protect 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights. I begin in Part I with a brief back-
ground of Sixth Amendment right-to-counsel jurisprudence, the plea 
bargaining process, and the evolution of the Supreme Court’s views on 
these topics. More specifically, Part I illustrates how the Court has gradually 
expanded the right to counsel, acknowledged the normative role of plea 
bargaining in criminal justice, and moved away from the notion that the 
criminal justice system’s only guarantee is the right to a fair trial. 
In Part II, I review Lafler, Frye, and the application of these cases in the 
lower courts. That review illustrates the evidentiary problems confronting 
defendants who claim ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea bargaining 
process. More pointedly, the review shows how defendants asserting such 
claims are often at the mercy of their defense attorneys, whose accounts of 
disputed events typically determine how the cases are decided. 
In Part III, I summarize the basic functions of defense counsel during 
the plea bargaining process, by consulting the standards set forth by the 
 
7 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012) (holding that there may be relief when a defendant demon-
strates, among other things, “that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable 
probability that the . . . defendant would have accepted the plea”). 
8 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“This Court now holds that, as a general rule, defense counsel 
has the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and 
conditions that may be favorable to the accused.”). 
9 See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 381 (1986) (“[D]efendant bears the burden of 
proving that counsel’s representation was unreasonable under prevailing professional norms and 
that the challenged action was not sound strategy.”) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668, 668-69 (1984)).  
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American Bar Association (ABA)10 and the National Legal Aid & Defender 
Association.11 Ultimately, I suggest that these standards should be the 
baseline against which courts measure the adequacy of counsel’s assistance 
in Sixth Amendment claims. 
 I argue in Part IV that requiring criminal defense lawyers to document 
plea bargain offers and their related advice is the best solution to this 
evidentiary problem. Support for my proposal is found in defense lawyers’ 
basic duties to preserve issues for appeal and to advocate zealously for their 
clients. Such a record would not only facilitate appellate court review of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims, but would also reduce the likelihood 
of defense lawyers committing errors in the first place and, as a result, 
would reduce the number of ineffective assistance of counsel claims litigat-
ed. Although the proposed record would add to the criminal defense 
counsel’s workload, it would be worthwhile when properly tailored to high-
risk cases. In Part V, I analyze two other possible solutions and conclude 
that the proposed record is superior to both. Finally, in Part VI, I provide a 
brief proposal of the record’s contents and discuss how courts may use it in 
practice. 
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF PLEA BARGAINING AND 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
A.  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
For much of the country’s history, the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel only protected criminal defendants’ right to hire attorneys if they so 
desired.12 These rights were expanded in the landmark case Gideon v. 
Wainwright, in which the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed 
government-provided counsel to indigent felony defendants.13 But the early 
right to counsel came with no guarantees as to the quality of representation. 
 
10 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3.2 (3d ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter ABA Standards]. 
11  Nat’l Legal Aid & Defender Ass’n, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR CRIMINAL DE-
FENSE REPRESENTATION §§ 6.1–6.4 (1995) [hereinafter NLADA GUIDELINES], available at 
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines#sixone. 
12 See William M. Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REV. 1150, 
1151-52 (1963) (contrasting the Sixth Amendment with the English common law’s “reluctan[ce] to 
allow even retained counsel in all felony cases until 1836”). 
13 See 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (concluding that the right to government-appointed counsel 
for indigent defendants is “fundamental and essential to fair trials”). The Court had previously 
held that the Due Process Clause demanded representation in certain egregious circumstances. See 
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65 (1932) (holding that a judge must appoint counsel in criminal 
prosecutions of particularly vulnerable defendants in capital cases). 
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In the Gideon era, the Court granted relief only where counsel was so 
deficient as to make the trial a “farce and mockery of justice.”14 Successful 
litigation of these claims was predictably rare. Like much of the expansion 
of defendants’ rights, the relaxation of this standard started in the lower 
courts.15 By the early 1980s, many circuits had already adopted a reasonable-
ness test for the assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court followed suit 
with its decision in Strickland v. Washington.16  
Strickland set out the modern two-pronged test for ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. First, “the defendant must show that counsel’s perfor-
mance was deficient.”17 The Court made it clear that this prong would be 
difficult to establish, noting that “[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel’s perfor-
mance must be highly deferential.”18 The Court held that a defendant could 
only satisfy this prong by showing that “counsel’s representation fell below 
an objective standard of reasonableness,” measured by prevailing profession-
al norms and professional standards put forth by the ABA and other 
organizations.19 Any conduct that may be justified as strategic in nature 
would almost certainly fail to satisfy this demanding standard.20 
Second, “the defendant must show that the deficient performance preju-
diced the defense.”21 This standard requires a “reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different.”22  
Since the Strickland decision, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
have become the most common ground for relief sought in habeas petitions. 
One 2007 study found in a random sample that eighty-one percent of 
habeas petitions in capital cases and fifty percent in noncapital cases 
included at least one claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.23 By 
 
14 See 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & SARAH N. WELLING, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 627, at 673 n.6 (2011) (noting that “th[is] phrase appears to have originated with 
Judge Thurman Arnold in Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (App. D.C. 1945)”). 
15 See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 117 n.16 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“A majority 
of courts have now passed beyond the standard of attorney competence embodied in the so-called 
‘mockery’ test, which abdicates any judicial supervision over attorney performance so long as the 
attorney does not make a farce of the trial.”). 
16 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
17 Id. at 687. 
18 Id. at 689. 
19 Id. at 687-89. 
20 Id. at 690-91 (“[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts rele-
vant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable . . . .”).  
21 Id. at 687.  
22 Id. at 694. 
23 NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE 
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extrapolation, the study indicated that over ten thousand habeas petitions 
raise ineffective assistance of counsel claims each year.24 Yet only 0.3 % of 
the noncapital petitions resulted in an evidentiary hearing.25 Even more 
alarming, only one of the 2384 noncapital cases in the sample group ob-
tained relief on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.26 These numbers 
reflect that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is, at best, only a tiny 
glimmer of hope for the convicted. 
B.  Ineffective Assistance in Plea Bargaining 
Plea bargains account for approximately ninety-five percent of criminal 
convictions.27 Typically, plea bargains are agreements between prosecutors 
and defendants through which defendants receive reductions in punishment 
and prosecutors save the time and resources required to try cases. Prosecu-
tors enjoy a great deal of discretion over the charges they bring and the 
sentences they recommend. Specifically, as part of the plea bargaining 
process, the prosecutor may offer to: (a) not bring additional charges, or 
move to dismiss charges already filed; (b) recommend, or agree not to 
oppose, the defendant’s request that a particular sentence or sentencing 
range is appropriate, or that a particular Sentencing Guidelines provision, 
policy statement, or sentencing factor does or does not apply; or (c) agree 
that a particular sentence or sentencing range is appropriate, or that a 
particular Sentencing Guidelines provision, policy statement, or sentencing 
factor does or does not apply.28 Defendants have fewer bargaining chips, but 
they may, for instance, agree to cooperate against other criminal suspects in 
 
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 
1996, 28 (2007), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. 
24 This figure assumes that the number of habeas petitions has remained consistent since 
2010, when the federal courts received over 20,000 petitions. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2011 ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR 126 tbl.C-2 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf. 
25 KING ET AL., supra note 23, at 36. 
26 Id. at 52. The rate of relief in capital cases was much higher, where 12.4 percent of non-
transferred habeas cases resulted in some form of relief. It is unclear how many of these cases 
successfully raised ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Id. at 51. 
27 See LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND CHARGE BARGAINING: 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011), available at https://www.bja.gov/Publications/ 
PleaBargainingResearchSummary.pdf (“[S]cholars estimate that about 90 to 95 percent of 
both federal and state court cases are resolved through the [plea bargaining] process.”). 
28 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(C)(1)(A)–(C). 
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exchange for a more favorable deal.29 The parties may strike a plea agree-
ment at nearly any stage during the course of criminal proceedings, from 
before the filing of charges through jury deliberations.30 
Traditionally, courts and academics paid little attention to the plea bar-
gaining process, instead trusting that the “shadow of the trial” ensured the 
fairness of the resulting deals.31 Under this theory, the backstop of a jury 
trial guarantees that defendants can only benefit from a plea bargain—
otherwise, they simply would reject the offers.32 A fair trial is the only 
guarantee the state provides; when defendants waive that right, they 
voluntarily take themselves outside of the state’s protection.33  
Over the past thirty years, however, the Supreme Court has gradually 
acknowledged the prominence of plea bargaining and has extended Sixth 
Amendment protection to certain aspects of the process. The Court first 
extended the Sixth Amendment to protect defendants against deficient 
counsel who misled them into entering a guilty plea.34 This extension of 
Sixth Amendment protection was consistent with the Court’s concern for 
the right to a jury trial. Where a person conceded that right on unreasona-
ble advice, the Court indicated that it would step in.35  
In 2010, the Court proceeded along the same paradigm in deciding Pa-
dilla v. Kentucky.36 In Padilla, the Court held that defense counsel is required 
to inform defendants of the possibility of deportation prior to their entering 
a guilty plea.37 The Court, motivated by its concern with protecting a 
 
29 See HARRY I. SUBIN ET AL., THE CRIMINAL PROCESS: PROSECUTION AND DE-
FENSE FUNCTIONS 139-41 (1993) (discussing the ways in which defendants can secure more 
favorable plea bargains by agreeing to cooperate with prosecutors). 
30 Id. at 131 (“[P]lea agreements can occur at almost any point in the process.”). 
31 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 
289, 310 (1983) (arguing that the free market approach to plea bargaining ensures the best results 
and that “there is no reason to think that plea bargaining regulations could do better”). 
32 See Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Con-
sumer Protection, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1117, 1124, 1125 (2011) (noting the traditional view that 
“regulation of trials should theoretically protect plea-bargaining defendants” who “can decide for 
themselves when bargains serve their interests”). 
33 See id. at 1124 (describing the traditional notion held by the courts that “[f]or the shadow 
of trial to work, defendants need know only that they are giving up their trial rights”). 
34 See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding that the two-part Strickland test “ap-
plies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel”). 
35 To that end, the Court held that the defendant could only show prejudice if he could prove 
that he would have gone to trial but for his counsel’s deficient performance. Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 
(“[T]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”). 
36 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
37 Id. at 1486 (“[W]e now hold that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a 
risk of deportation.”). 
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defendant’s right to a jury trial, once again indicated that it was willing to 
step in to ensure that defendants did not waive their right to a trial due to 
inadequate advice from their counsel.38 Nevertheless, prominent criminal 
law scholars characterized the decision as a shift in Supreme Court criminal 
law jurisprudence toward the recognition of plea bargaining “as the norm.”39 
It was not until Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, however, that the shift 
became clear. 
II. LAFLER, FRYE, AND THE AFTERMATH 
A. The Lafler and Frye Decisions 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lafler and Frye are important not be-
cause they will change the outcome of many ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims (they will not), but because through these decisions the Court finally 
disconnected the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel from its right to a fair 
trial. As a result of these decisions, a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights 
are now deemed to have been violated when ineffective assistance of counsel 
causes him to go to trial rather than accept a favorable plea offer. 
Lafler v. Cooper concerned a defendant who had been charged with, 
among other crimes, assault with intent to murder.40 The defendant admit-
ted his guilt to the Court and told his lawyer that he wanted to take the 
prosecution’s plea bargain offer, whereby he would face a likely sentence of 
fifty-one to eighty-five months in exchange for pleading guilty.41 His lawyer, 
however, advised him that the prosecution would be unable to prove his 
intent to murder, as he had shot the victim below the waist.42 On that faulty 
advice, the defendant rejected the plea bargain offer and went to trial. He 
was convicted and the court sentenced him to 185 to 360 months’ imprison-
ment, a range 300 percent higher than that of the plea bargain.43 
In responding to the defendant’s federal habeas petition, the State of 
Michigan predictably relied upon the proposition that had seemingly driven 
the Court’s jurisprudence to that point: “the sole purpose of the Sixth 
 
38 Although the Court held that the defense attorney’s performance was deficient, it did not 
grant relief to Padilla. Instead, the Court remanded the case in order to determine whether Padilla 
suffered any prejudice due to his counsel’s deficiency. Id. at 1487. 
39 See Bibas, supra note 32, at 1137 (arguing that Padilla represented a “large shift[] in the 
landscape,” whereby “the Court’s frame of reference now treats bargaining as the norm”). 
40 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).  
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
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Amendment is to protect the right to a fair trial.”44 The Court, however, 
disagreed and, in a marked departure from its previous interpretations of 
the Sixth Amendment, held that “[t]he constitutional guarantee applies to 
pretrial critical stages that are part of the whole course of a criminal 
proceeding, a proceeding in which defendants cannot be presumed to make 
critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”45 In short, the Court finally 
rejected the fictitious notion that a fair trial remediated any and all pretrial 
errors. The Court then elaborated a standard of review for situations in 
which defendants claimed that ineffective assistance of counsel led them 
imprudently to reject a plea bargain offer: 
[A] defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there 
is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to 
the court (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the pros-
ecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), 
that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sen-
tence, or both, under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than un-
der the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.46 
After determining that the defendant had satisfied this standard, the 
Court ordered the State of Michigan to reoffer the plea bargain to the 
defendant and allowed the state trial court to exercise its discretion in 
determining whether and how much of the plea agreement it would be 
willing to accept.47 
In Missouri v. Frye, the defense attorney failed to convey the prosecu-
tion’s two plea bargain offers, both of which offered highly favorable reduc-
tions in the severity of the defendant’s punishment, to the defendant.48 Frye 
had been charged with driving with a revoked license.49 Since he had been 
convicted of the same offense three times before, Frye faced up to four 
 
44 Id. at 1385; see also Brief for the Petitioner at 11, Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) 
(No. 10-209) (“Strickland and its progeny make clear that when a court reviews a trial-court 
criminal proceeding, a fair trial is the main event; alleged error that does not impact a trial’s 
reliability does not implicate the Sixth Amendment.”). 
45 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385.  
46 Id. In creating this standard, the Court relied upon the established standard for defendants 
who claimed to have entered a guilty plea because of ineffective assistance of counsel. That 
standard, articulated twenty-seven years earlier in Hill v. Lockhart, required a petitioner to 
demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would have rejected a guilty plea offer if not for the 
deficient conduct of his lawyer. 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). 
47 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1391. 
48 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012). 
49 Id. 
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years’ imprisonment if convicted again.50 However, Frye seemingly caught a 
break when the prosecutor sent the defense counsel a letter outlining two 
possible plea bargains, one of which was an offer to reduce the charge to a 
misdemeanor with a ninety-day recommended sentence in exchange for a 
guilty plea.51 But the offer, which the defense attorney never presented to 
Frye, expired six weeks later.52 Frye went on to plead guilty without any 
underlying bargain, and the court sentenced him to three years in prison.53 
The Supreme Court held that the defense counsel’s failure to communicate 
the prosecution’s plea bargain offer was a violation of the defendant’s right 
to effective assistance of counsel.54  
B. The Landscape After Lafler and Frye 
The cases that have followed Lafler and Frye demonstrate the futility of 
defendants’ new Sixth Amendment rights.55 The burden placed on appeal-
ing defendants has proven exceedingly difficult to meet for several reasons. 
First, scant evidence causes most cases to turn into he-said/she-said disputes 
 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1404-05. 
54 Id. at 1408 (“This Court now holds that, as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to 
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may 
be favorable to the accused.”). 
55 The Supreme Court recently had an opportunity to address some of the issues described in 
this Comment, but, as expected, it declined to do so. In Burt v. Titlow, decided while this 
Comment was in production, the Court reversed a Sixth Circuit decision that a lawyer provided 
ineffective assistance when his client, Titlow, withdrew from a favorable plea deal on his advice. 
No. 12-414, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2013). Titlow was convicted of first-degree murder after 
bypassing a plea deal for manslaughter. Id. at 2. Titlow appealed her conviction to the Michigan 
Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction and held that the lawyer’s advice was reasonably 
based on Titlow’s protestations of innocence. Id. at 3. Titlow then filed a habeas petition, upon 
which the District Court applied AEDPA’s deferential standard to uphold the state court’s 
decision denying her relief. Id. The Sixth Circuit, noting that Titlow’s lawyer explained at the 
hearing to withdraw the plea that the decision to withdraw was based on the sentencing range of 
the plea, and not Titlow’s innocence, reversed the District Court. Id. The Supreme Court reversed 
the Sixth Circuit, however, noting that (1) federal courts must show deference to state court 
findings of fact and (2) Titlow bore the burden of showing that her lawyer provided inadequate 
advice; she did not meet this burden. Id. at 8-10.  
Burt v. Titlow presented the same fundamental problem addressed in this Comment. There 
was simply no record of the lawyer’s advice. The decision to proceed to trial looked like a terrible 
one, but Titlow could not show that she made it based on her lawyer’s advice. Justice Sotomayor, 
in her concurrence, even suggested that Titlow could have prevailed had she “made a better factual 
record.” Id. at 2 (Nov. 5, 2013) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). In this Comment, I suggest that the 
criminal defendant is the wrong party to look to for good documentation. Instead, the court 
should look to defense counsel for a record of effective assistance. 
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between defendants and their attorneys. Second, courts generally find 
lawyers to be more credible than convicted criminals, and defendants have 
little evidence to overcome that presumption. Furthermore, courts defer to 
defense lawyers’ conduct if it can be characterized as reasonably strategic 
behavior. Finally, even if defendants can convince a court that they received 
deficient counsel, they still need to show that the deficiency prejudiced the 
outcome of the proceedings.56 All of this amounts to a difficult burden, even 
when defense counsel cooperates, and an impossible one otherwise.  
1. The He-said/she-said Phenomenon 
In the plea bargaining context, the typical ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claim asserts that the lawyer gave the defendant faulty advice that led 
him to reject a favorable plea bargain offer. These types of claims usually 
implicate either the counsel’s investigation or advice. Both investigation and 
advice occur privately and off the record, and are therefore difficult for 
courts to review.57 In practice, defendants can only hope that their lawyers 
remember the disputed issues and confess their mistakes rather than try to 
justify them as valid strategic decisions. Another phenomenon exacerbates 
this difficulty: When the advice is alleged to be egregiously flawed, and the 
resulting injustice commensurately more severe, courts may find it difficult, 
without evidence, to believe that the lawyer would make such an error. 
However, when the alleged error is less egregious, and its occurrence is 
therefore more plausible, it is much more likely that courts will deem the 
advice to have been within the realm of valid strategy or to have had no 
effect on the outcome of the proceedings. 
The case of United States v. Stockton,58 described in the introduction of 
this Comment, illustrates the he-said/she-said phenomenon. In that case, 
the defendant, Rolando Stockton, was offered two plea bargains, both of 
which called for a sentence of no more than ten years’ imprisonment in 
return for a guilty plea.59 On appeal, Stockton claimed that he rejected 
these offers because he believed, based on his lawyer’s erroneous advice, that 
he faced no more than ten years’ imprisonment if he was convicted at trial.60 
 
56 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
57 See Gerard E. Lynch, Frye and Lafler: No Big Deal, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 42 (2012), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/06/21/lynch.html (arguing that the lack of a record may lead more 
defendants to allege ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining, but that the history of 
similar claims regarding off-the-record trial activities indicates that these claims are unlikely to be 
successful). 
58 No. 99-0352, 2012 WL 2675240 (D. Md. July 5, 2012). 
59 Id. at *4. 
60 Id.  
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The lawyer, however, claimed that he reviewed the offer line by line with his 
client and advised Stockton that it was a “good offer.”61 Even though the 
decision to go to trial was objectively bad, and one that no reasonable, well-
informed individual would make, the court still found that “Trial Counsel 
reviewed the plea agreement letter in at least sufficient detail to include a 
review of the statement therein of the maximum potential sentence faced.”62 
The court gave the lawyer the benefit of the doubt, and Stockton lost his 
appeal.63 
This outcome is far from unique. A Connecticut appellate court, for 
example, recently denied petitioner Dario Bertotti’s claim that his lawyer, 
without consulting him, rejected a plea agreement that offered an eight-year 
sentence. His lawyer’s actions caused him to go to trial, where the court 
sentenced Bertotti to twelve years’ imprisonment.64 Bertotti’s sister corrob-
orated his account of the events.65 His lawyer, however, argued that Bertotti 
rejected the offer because he thought he would receive a more lenient 
sentence after trial due to his cooperation with the authorities.66 No record 
existed to validate either side’s assertions. Even so, the court sided with the 
lawyer, finding that Bertotti rejected the plea agreement even after the 
lawyer advised him that “the state had a strong case and that [he] should 
accept the state’s offer . . . .”67  
These cases typify the evidentiary burden faced by defendants seeking 
to vindicate their Sixth Amendment rights under Lafler and Frye. Where 
the lawyer’s testimony contradicts the facts alleged by the defendant, the 
defendant is unlikely to win his case.68 
 
61 Id. at *10. 
62 Id. at *8. 
63 Id. at *14. 
64 Bertotti v. Comm’r of Correction, 44 A.3d 892, 895 (Conn. App. Ct. 2012). 
65 Id.  
66 Id.  
67 Id.  
68 Even when the lawyer agrees with the defendant as to his deficient conduct, the court may 
nonetheless find that the uncontroverted testimony is not credible. See, e.g., Merzbacher v. 
Shearin, 706 F.3d 356, 361-62, 365 (4th Cir. 2013) (describing a state court’s finding that the 
defendant’s lawyer had committed perjury when she testified that she had never conveyed a plea 
bargain offer to her client, even though there was “not a shred of evidence that [the defendant]’s 
lawyers counseled him about the plea”). But see Satterlee v. Wolfenbarger, 453 F.3d 362, 364 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (finding the defendant’s story more credible than the defense lawyer’s because it was 
supported by testimony from his mother and the prosecution). 
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2. Deference to the Strategic Conduct of the Defense Lawyer 
The next hurdle faced by the defendant is proving that the deficient 
conduct of the lawyer was actually unreasonable, rather than merely a 
suboptimal strategic move. This difficulty is ubiquitous in Strickland cases, 
even those outside of the plea bargaining context. The Strickland standard is 
highly deferential to the lawyer, establishing a presumption of reasonable-
ness that the defendant must overcome.69 The key inquiry is whether the 
attorney properly investigated the circumstances of his client’s case prior to 
making a strategic decision.70 If the dispute concerns the strategic decision 
rather than the adequacy of the preceding investigation, the defendant will 
have a difficult time overcoming the presumption of reasonableness accord-
ed to his lawyer’s choices. That deference spells the demise of most ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims, regardless of the context. 
In Johnson v. United States, a federal district court in Iowa found the de-
fense counsels’ behavior “troubling” when they failed to tell their client, 
who faced the death penalty, that her only reasonable option was to take a 
plea agreement to life imprisonment.71 Specifically, the court chastised the 
lawyers for failing to marshal evidence that would convince their client 
about the wisdom of accepting such a plea and for failing to enlist family 
members to help convince the defendant to take the agreement.72 Instead, 
the lawyers took a wait-and-see approach to the case, ostensibly hoping that 
evidentiary issues would force the prosecutor’s hand.73 Ultimately, this 
proved to be a poor strategy, and the defendant was convicted and sen-
tenced to death.74 The court found that “[b]eing very troubled with these 
circumstances, however, is short of finding that her trial counsel’s perfor-
mance in these respects was professionally incompetent.”75  
Many such cases are lost in the gray area between poor strategy and pro-
fessional incompetence. While this would be expected if the purpose of the 
ineffective assistance of counsel action were disciplinary (i.e., focused on the 
 
69 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) (“Because of the difficulties inherent in 
making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome 
the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound 
trial strategy.” (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)). 
70 See, e.g., Worthington v. Roper, 631 F.3d 487, 502 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting that the defense 
counsel’s reasonable investigation of mental health evidence established a presumption of 
reasonableness regarding his decision not to mount a mental health mitigation case). 
71  860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 782 (N.D. Iowa 2012). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 780-81. 
74 Id. at 680. 
75 Id. at 782. 
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lawyer), it is less sensible when the purpose is to ensure that defendants 
receive adequate representation. Nevertheless, this is a very real hurdle to 
Sixth Amendment claims. 
3. Evidentiary Difficulties in the Prejudice Prong of the Strickland Test 
A defendant who is able to overcome the deficient-conduct prong of the 
Strickland test must then satisfy the prejudice prong by establishing a 
reasonable probability that, but for the deficient lawyering of his counsel, 
the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.76 In the Lafler–
Frye paradigm, a defendant must demonstrate that he would have taken a 
plea bargain and that the court would have accepted the terms of the plea 
bargain.77 Here, a defendant faces the inevitable evidentiary (and psycho-
logical)78 barriers of proving hypotheticals. 
First, a defendant must prove that, if not for the ineffective assistance of 
his counsel, he would have accepted the plea bargain that he ultimately 
declined. Defendants most often attempt to prove this through their 
personal testimony, simply asserting that they would have accepted the 
offers. However, this testimony is obvious, and courts are apt to find it self-
serving.79 Other than personal testimony, a defendant can usually point only 
to the objective superiority of the plea agreement he turned down. Specifi-
cally, the defendant would argue that the plea agreement was so far superior 
to going to trial that any reasonable person would have taken the offer, had 
he been provided sound advice from counsel. Yet courts offer no presump-
tion of reasonableness to the criminal defendant. Courts look only to 
subjective evidence to determine what a particular defendant would have 
done had he been given effective counsel. 
Even if a defendant can convince the court that he would have accepted 
the plea bargain, he may have to prove that the offer was still open at the 
time of his attorney’s deficient lawyering. In Tucker v. Clarke, a federal 
 
76 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 673 (1984). 
77 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1385 (2012). 
78 One such psychological barrier is the confirmatory bias, by which judges might view out-
comes as being inevitable and discount the possible difference effective counsel could have made. 
See generally Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 3 (2004). 
79 See, e.g., Packer v. United States, No. 08-153, 2012 WL 3580520, at *4 (S.D. Ala. July 16, 
2012) (“Here, Packer’s self-serving declaration notwithstanding, the weight of the evidence 
indicates that . . . Packer strongly advocated . . . his innocence and his aversion to pleading guilty 
for any reason in this Court.”). Courts have a good reason to be suspicious—many defendants 
would presumably lie in order to reduce their sentence. However there are certainly some 
defendants who would have actually accepted the plea agreement that was offered to them. 
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district court in Virginia denied relief to the petitioner who alleged that his 
attorney failed to communicate his acceptance of a plea deal to the prosecu-
tor.80 Noting that the defendant only decided to accept the plea deal during 
jury deliberations, the court held that the defendant failed to meet his 
burden of proving that the prosecution’s offer was still open.81 The court 
cited no evidence that the offer was closed, but it nevertheless found that 
“Tucker has not demonstrated that the Commonwealth would have accepted 
his agreement . . . .”82 While this is an exceptional case—defendants rarely 
accept plea deals during jury deliberations—it demonstrates courts’ willing-
ness to construe events in ways that increase defendants’ evidentiary 
burdens. In theory, a court could presume in almost every case that the 
prosecution rescinded its plea offer before the defendant’s hypothetical 
acceptance, and the defendant would be hard-pressed to prove otherwise.  
Defendants face a similar difficulty when their lawyers fail to initiate 
negotiations with the prosecution over potential plea bargains.  
Even though such a failure may at times rise to deficient counsel, the 
absence of any evidence that the prosecution would have agreed to a deal is 
dispositive. In one recent New York state court case, a defendant, after 
being counseled by his lawyer, accepted the prosecution’s plea offer and 
agreed to serve a one-year sentence in exchange for pleading guilty to 
attempted assault.83 On appeal, the defendant argued that his lawyer was 
deficient during plea negotiations for not requesting a sentence of 364 days, 
since such a sentence would have saved the defendant from automatic 
deportation.84 Although it seems plausible that the prosecutor might have 
agreed to such a deal, the court was ultimately “not persuaded that the 
District Attorney would have consented to a sentence of even one day less 
than one year in jail.”85  
These examples show that the prejudice prong of the Strickland test pre-
sents real difficulties for defendants seeking relief for ineffective assistance 
of counsel in plea bargaining. When combined with courts’ deference to 
lawyers’ strategic decision-making and the he-said/she-said phenomenon, 
the burden placed on defendants is nearly insurmountable.  
 
80  No. 2:12- 00040, 2012 WL 3985516, at *3-4 (E.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2012). 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at *4. 
83 People v. Castillo, No. 1690-03, 2012 WL 1570975, at *1-2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
84 Id. at *4. 
85 Id. at *5-6. 
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C.  Is This a Real Problem? 
The mere existence of a difficult evidentiary burden does not prove that 
defendants who have valid ineffective assistance of counsel claims are losing 
in court. It may be that defense lawyers are always forthcoming when 
confronted with allegations of deficient conduct and that the he-said/she-
said phenomenon is indicative not of injustice or untruthful lawyers, but of 
desperate defendants seeking to undo their own mistakes.86 Indeed, it is 
impossible to know how often valid ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are lost due to malfeasance, bias, or poor memory on the part of the defense 
lawyer. Determining the number of valid claims that fail for these reasons, 
much like figuring out how many innocent defendants are convicted, is an 
exceedingly difficult task; the same deficiencies that led the court to the 
wrong ruling prevent a conclusive post-hoc review.87 Yet, just like the 
innocence question, certain facts make it apparent that the problem exists. 
First, there have been a number of cases in which defendants have suc-
cessfully established ineffective assistance of counsel in plea bargaining. 
Lafler and Frye are but two prominent examples.88 These cases establish 
with certainty that defense counsel at times provides ineffective assistance 
in plea bargaining. The only questions that remain are how often this occurs 
and whether or not the current system adequately addresses these valid 
claims. 
Second, the sheer volume of criminal cases belies the assertion that de-
fense lawyers never misrepresent—due to dishonesty, bias, or just a foggy 
 
86 See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (“The opportunity to try his 
former lawyer has its undoubted attraction to a disappointed prisoner. In many cases there is no 
written transcript and so he has a clear field for the exercise of his imagination. . . . To allow a 
prisoner to try the issue of the effectiveness of his counsel under a liberal definition of that phrase 
is to give every convict the privilege of opening a Pandora’s box of accusations which trial courts 
near large penal institutions would be compelled to hear.”). 
87 See Beth Schwartzapfel & Hannah Levintova, How Many Innocent People are in Prison?, 
MOTHER JONES (Dec. 12, 2011, 8:10 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2011/12/ 
innocent-people-us-prisons (describing the difficulties in determining the rate of false convic-
tions). 
88 Others include United States v. Mooney, 497 F.3d 397 (4th Cir. 2007); Maples v. Stegall, 427 
F.3d 1020 (6th Cir. 2005); Cerda v. Hedgpetch, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2010); United States 
v. DeSimone, 736 F. Supp. 2d 477 (D.R.I. 2010); and United States v. Winsor, 675 F. Supp. 2d 1069 
(D. Or. 2009). These cases and numerous others are detailed in TERESA L. NORRIS, SUMMAR-
IES OF PUBLISHED SUCCESSFUL INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL CLAIMS POST-
WIGGINS V. SMITH 352-54 (2013), available at http://www.capdefnet.org/hat/uploadedfiles/ 
public/helpful_cases/ineffective_assistance_of_counsel/IAC%20Post-Wiggins%203-21-13.pdf. 
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memory—the events that occur during plea negotiations.89 In light of the 
millions of criminal cases each year, the notion that all lawyers freely 
confess their mistakes is unrealistic. In fact, it may be that the most ineffec-
tive lawyers are the most likely to resist admitting their mistakes.90 Given 
the enormous volume of cases, the known occurrence of defective counsel-
ing, and the high possibility of lawyers’ noncooperation, there are certainly 
some valid Sixth Amendment claims that are defeated in postconviction 
proceedings. 
Even if this is a rare occurrence, something I concede only for the sake 
of argument, the stakes are high enough to warrant a response. The system 
severely punishes criminal defendants who bypass plea bargain offers. One 
federal district court judge found that sentences in the District of Massa-
chusetts after trial are, on average, five hundred percent more severe than 
the sentences available in plea negotiations.91 To make matters worse, the 
odds are stacked against the defendant if he decides to go to trial because 
the great majority of criminal trials result in convictions.92 Therefore, there 
is much riding on the decision to accept or reject a plea bargain. Given the 
importance of this decision, even a low number of cases presents a large 
enough problem to warrant protective measures. 
III. THE DUTIES OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN PLEA BARGAINING 
To address ineffective assistance of counsel in the context of plea bar-
gaining, it is first necessary to understand the role that counsel plays in the 
process. In this Part, I summarize the duties of defense counsel in the plea 
bargaining context. To do so, I will examine existing standards for defense 
 
89 There were over twenty million felony, misdemeanor, and other criminal cases reported by 
state courts alone in 2010. See Criminal Caseloads Continue to Decline, COURT STATISTICS 
PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Criminal/20121Criminal.aspx (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). 
90 Deficient conduct that implicates the lawyer’s fitness may expose him to potential discipli-
nary action, giving the lawyer an even stronger incentive not to admit an error that cannot 
otherwise be proven. See generally Ellen Henak, When the Interests of Self, Clients, and Colleagues 
Collide: The Ethics of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. J. TRIAL. ADVOC. 347, 356-58 
(2009) (discussing the intersection between ineffective assistance of counsel claims and possible 
ethical violations).  
91 Berthoff v. United States, 140 F. Supp. 2d 50, 67-69 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting that “[a]s a 
practical matter this means, as between two similarly situated defendants, that if the one who 
pleads and cooperates gets a four-year sentence, then the guideline sentence for the one who 
exercises his right to trial by jury and is convicted will be twenty years”). 
92 See CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENSE 
COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000) (reporting that “[a]pproximately 9 in 10 Federal 
defendants and 3 in 4 State defendants in the 75 largest counties [in the United States] were found 
guilty”). 
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counsel, such as those of the ABA and the NLADA. A synthesis of these 
standards reveals three main categories of tasks that defense counsel usually 
undertakes during the plea bargaining process: investigation, negotiation, 
and client communication. The defense lawyer employs each of these in an 
effort “to seek the lawful objectives of his client.”93 
A.  Investigation 
Thoroughly investigating a defendant’s case is one of the most basic, yet 
important, responsibilities of a defense lawyer.94 Defense counsel must 
conduct a thorough investigation before he advises his client or negotiates 
with the prosecutor regarding plea agreements.95 The scope of investigation 
depends on the individual case, but organizations like the NLADA have 
promulgated broadly applicable standards to which I refer. 
The defense lawyer’s first investigative responsibility is to characterize 
the consequences of going to trial. If the decision to accept a plea bargain is 
to be viewed as a cost–benefit analysis, then the consequences of trial 
represent an entire side of the equation. The NLADA lists six pieces of 
information that the lawyer should ascertain:  
(1) the maximum term of imprisonment and fine or restitution that may be 
ordered, and any mandatory punishment or sentencing guideline system;  
(2) the possibility of forfeiture of assets;  
(3) other consequences of conviction such as deportation, and civil disabili-
ties; 
(4) any possible and likely sentence enhancements or parole consequences;  
(5) the possible and likely place and manner of confinement;  
(6) the effect of good-time credits on the sentence of the client and the 
general range of sentences for similar offenses committed by defendants with 
similar backgrounds.96 
 
93 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-101(A)(1) (1980). 
94 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, § 4-4.1(a) (“Defense counsel should conduct a 
prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts 
relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of conviction. . . . T[his] duty to 
investigate exists regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts 
constituting guilt or the accused’s stated desire to plead guilty.”). 
95 The Supreme Court offered as much over sixty years ago: “Prior to trial an accused is 
entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, 
pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be 
entered.” Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 721 (1948). 
96 NLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, at § 6.2. 
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Second, the lawyer should investigate the probability of the client’s con-
viction. Understanding the likelihood of conviction is an essential compo-
nent to understanding whether or not a defendant should take a plea deal. 
For example, a defendant may face the death penalty, but if there were no 
possibility of conviction, then it would be a poor decision to accept a plea 
bargain. This duty to investigate means “explor[ing] all avenues leading to 
facts relevant to the merits of the case,” making “efforts to secure infor-
mation in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authori-
ties,” and doing these things without regard to whether the defendant has 
confessed guilt or expressed a desire to plead guilty.97 Even a guilty defend-
ant is entitled to the lawyer’s best efforts to secure the most favorable deal. 
These first two steps provide the basis for determining the likelihood 
and severity of possible trial outcomes. The lawyer and client will later 
measure these against the plea bargain offer. But this is not the end of the 
investigation. The lawyer should also investigate the historical plea bargain 
outcomes of similarly situated defendants, determining the “going rate,” or 
the “county-specific range of acceptable sentences for a given offense.”98 
This knowledge can be incredibly important during the negotiation pro-
cess.99 While experienced defense lawyers, or “repeat players,” might have 
developed an understanding of such going rates, inexperienced lawyers 
should seek historical data and advice from more experienced peers to 
determine how a given deal measures up against those typically offered 
under similar circumstances. 
B.  Negotiation 
After conducting a thorough investigation of the case against the de-
fendant, the defense attorney should then prepare to negotiate with the 
prosecution in order to secure the best possible outcome for her client.100 
 
97 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, § 4=4.1(a). 
98 PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND 
THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS 208 (1988). 
99 This knowledge is an even more critical area of investigation for inexperienced defense 
attorneys. For instance, one such attorney offered the following account of his early years: “Yeah, I 
got burned a number of times. I had a case where my guy got six months in jail. Now, with the 
same case I would get a suspended sentence. You’ve just got to learn through experience what a 
case is worth.” MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECU-
TORS, JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 76 (1978). 
100 See TED A. DONNER, ATTORNEY’S PRACTICE GUIDE TO NEGOTIATIONS § 13:1 
(2012) (“[A]n ‘effective’ negotiator is one who can maximize his or her client's return, maintain a 
positive relationship with the opposition and still maintain the dignity of the profession.”). 
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Prosecutors have broad discretion to enter into plea deals,101 and they have 
an interest in avoiding costly trials, which means that they are often willing 
to negotiate. Defining the standards for how defense lawyers should go 
about plea negotiations, however, is a difficult endeavor because lawyers all 
have their own styles.102 Courts should therefore look beyond most strategic 
or behavioral peculiarities.103 To complicate matters further, while a good 
attorney might skillfully secure a plea bargain that meets or exceeds the 
going rate, the failure of a lesser attorney to do so is not per se evidence of 
ineffective assistance.  
The first requirement of negotiating is that the defense lawyer must rep-
resent his client’s interests.104 The lawyer should consult with the client to 
ensure a mutual understanding of the client’s plea bargaining goals and the 
lawyer’s role in achieving those goals.105 Only after this consultation has 
occurred should the lawyer attempt to negotiate the client’s desired result.106 
If the prosecution has not yet broached the subject of a plea bargain, the 
defense attorney should initiate negotiations when it is advantageous to do 
so. For example, a defense attorney should seek a deal quickly if it becomes 
evident that his client’s case will weaken over time.107 Notably, the lawyer 
should make this assessment without regard to the client’s proclamations of 
 
101 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (authorizing the prosecutor to negotiate a plea bargain with 
defense counsel and detailing what a plea agreement may contain). 
102 For a discussion of the different ways some attorneys go about negotiations, see DON-
NER, supra note 100, § 13:1 (“[S]ome will find they work best when they have the opportunity to 
meet with the other side, learn their interests and explore ways to establish mutual trust. Others 
will be more comfortable behind a desk, where they can limit their interactions to the occasional 
email or phone call. In the end, there is nothing inherently right or wrong about either approach, 
or most any other for that matter. There are bound to be stylistic differences among virtually 
everyone who involves themselves in negotiations.”). 
103 See, e.g., Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 741 (2011) (“The art of negotiation is at least as 
nuanced as the art of trial advocacy . . . . There are, moreover, special difficulties in evaluating the 
basis for counsel's judgment: An attorney often has insights borne of past dealings with the same 
prosecutor or court . . . .”).  
104 See DONNER, supra note 100 (“[T]he attorney who seeks to represent someone's interests 
in negotiation must be aware of, and understand those interests.”). 
105 See NLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § 6.1(a) (“Counsel should explore with the 
client the possibility and desirability of reaching a negotiated disposition of charges rather than 
proceeding to a trial . . . .”). 
106 See id. § 6.1(b) (“Counsel should ordinarily obtain the consent of the client before enter-
ing into any plea negotiation.”). 
107 If the lawyer expects the prosecution to discover additional evidence that strengthens the 
case against the client, then he can expect that the prosecutor, as a rational bargainer, will offer less 
attractive deals as this evidence is uncovered. On the other hand, if the lawyer expects to uncover 
additional exculpatory or mitigating evidence, then it may be best to wait to negotiate. 
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innocence or guilt, which may have little relationship to the strength of the 
case on either side.108  
Once negotiations are in progress, the lawyer should continuously evalu-
ate the options available to his client in order to determine whether a 
particular plea offer is favorable. Decision analysis109 presents a helpful tool 
to approach this assessment. Under that analysis, the lawyer would weigh 
the terms of the deal against the probability and severity of the various trial 
outcomes. For instance, if a client faces a ninety percent chance of convic-
tion at trial with a likely sentence of ten years, then a plea bargain offering a 
nine-year sentence is objectively reasonable.110 Anything more than nine 
years would be unfavorable to the defendant. Thus, the lawyer should 
negotiate a deal that, at a minimum, meets this criterion. 
Finally, the lawyer should compare any plea bargain offer to the going 
rate to ensure that his client is receiving a historically equitable deal. If plea 
bargaining is now the norm, then the going rate indicates a just sentence, 
and the lawyer should resist or counter any proposal that exceeds that 
rate.111 In such cases, the lawyer might draw the prosecutor’s attention to 
previous deals and propose adjustments based on case-specific details. 
 
108 Whether the client, in private, claims to be innocent or guilty does not change the objec-
tive evidentiary circumstances of the case or govern the course of plea negotiations. Of course, a 
plausible claim of innocence may indicate that future investigation will lead to additional 
exculpatory evidence. This factor weighs in favor of holding off on plea negotiations. See Robert 
E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1937 (1992) (“The 
likelihood that D will be convicted is (one hopes) strongly correlated with D’s actual guilt or 
innocence: in general, innocent defendants can more easily find evidence that exonerates them (or 
that casts doubt on the government’s theory of the case) than guilty ones can.”). 
109 See generally Ronald A. Howard, Decision Analysis and Law, 22 CARDOZO L. REV. 1595 
(2001) (providing a background of the history of decision analysis and its applicability to law). See 
also Decision Analysis, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Decision_analysis (last visited Jan. 
24, 2014) (providing a general discussion on decision analysis). 
110 See George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph, 109 YALE L.J. 857, 1069 (2000) (“If the 
defendant regards his chances of acquittal at trial to be, say, thirty percent, he normally will 
demand in exchange for his guilty plea a deduction of about thirty percent from the sentence he 
would have faced had he gone to trial and lost.”). Consequences other than incarceration should be 
measured either alongside or within the decision analysis. If such factors are measured within the 
decision analysis, then each consequence should be normalized to reflect its value in terms of 
imprisonment. For example, deportation may be the equivalent of five years in prison. Thus, a 
five-year prison sentence with a deportation consequence would have the same value as ten years 
in prison.  
111 See Bibas, supra note 32, at 1140 (“The going rate amounts to equal treatment, not some 
unfair advantage over others. Once one stops viewing trials as setting the normal and normative 
baseline, one need not denigrate good defense lawyering as thwarting normal, just outcomes.”). 
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C. Client Communication 
The third major aspect of the defense lawyer’s role in the plea bargain-
ing process is effective communication with the client. Specifically, the 
lawyer must listen to his client’s wishes and must ensure that his client has a 
full understanding of the relevant circumstances.  
First, the lawyer “should explore with the client the possibility and de-
sirability of reaching a negotiated disposition of the charges.”112 Some 
clients may wish as a matter of principal to plead not guilty and may be 
opposed to any plea bargain offer, regardless of the objective reasonableness 
of such an offer. The overwhelming majority, however, will wish to secure a 
good plea bargain offer rather than risk the possibility of receiving a severe 
punishment at trial.113 
Next, the lawyer should “keep the client fully informed of any . . . nego-
tiations and convey . . . any offers . . . .”114 It was this very duty that the 
defense lawyer in Frye neglected to fulfill.115 A defendant is entitled to be 
informed of all plea bargain offers and to decide whether to accept or reject 
those offers.116 The lawyer may think that the offer is lousy, but the decision 
to reject it belongs to the client alone. 
Finally, the lawyer must ensure that her client comprehends the decision 
to accept or reject any plea bargain offer. The lawyer should “make certain 
that the client understands the rights he will waive by entering the plea . . .; 
the conditions and limits of the plea agreement and the maximum punish-
ment, sanctions, and other consequences . . .; and the nature of the plea 
hearing.”117 The lawyer should communicate in nontechnical language,118 
keeping in mind that “even the intelligent and educated layman has small 
and sometimes no skill in the science of the law . . . . He requires the 
guiding hand of counsel at every step of the proceedings . . . .”119 This 
“guiding hand” should avoid treating the duty to inform the client as a 
formality, and instead should invest the necessary time and effort to make 
 
112 NLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § 6.1(a). 
113 This result is evident in that the overwhelming majority of criminal cases end in a guilty 
plea. 
114 NLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § 6.1(c). 
115 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
116 See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“[A]s a general rule, defense counsel has 
the duty to communicate formal offers from the prosecution . . . .”). 
117 NLADA GUIDELINES, supra note 11, § 6.4(a). 
118 See Bibas, supra note 32, at 1155 (suggesting that plain English summaries of plea agree-
ments may improve a defendant’s understanding of those agreements). 
119 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). 
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certain that the client truly understands each aspect of the critical decision 
to accept or reject a plea bargain offer. 
Finally, the lawyer must give appropriate advice to the client. Authori-
ties differ as to the extent that defense lawyers should direct their clients to 
a decision. Lower courts have held that lawyers need not advise clients to 
make a certain decision regarding a plea offer, provided that they inform the 
clients of the relevant information on the legal issues at stake.120 The 
Supreme Court would most certainly endorse this position.121 However, 
some scholars and practitioners argue that effective defense counsel should 
encourage—aggressively, at times—defendants to make the decision that is 
in their best interests.122 These scholars and practitioners argue that in 
practice many defendants, unable to fully comprehend the options in front 
of them, look to their lawyers to tell them what to do.123 Ultimately, I find 
this argument compelling—even if the judicial system allows otherwise, an 
effective lawyer will steer clients to the decision that is in their best inter-
ests. 
IV. JUSTIFYING A NEW RECORD 
As the chief advocates for defendants’ rights, defense attorneys should 
be especially concerned with the apparent difficulties in vindicating defend-
ants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel in the plea bargaining 
context. Although some scholars have proposed changes to the law or to 
criminal procedure that would make it easier for defendants to vindicate 
these rights,124 courts are far from adopting such suggestions. The criminal 
 
120 See, e.g., United States v. Stockton, No. 99-0352, 2012 WL 2675240, at *12 (D. Md. July 5, 
2012) (holding that a defense lawyer was not required to advise his client that he should accept an 
offer of ten years’ imprisonment even though the client faced a possible life sentence and the 
prosecution had a strong case). 
121 See Bibas, supra note 32, at 1139 (documenting the Supreme Court’s continued focus on 
whether the defendant made the decision to accept or reject a plea bargain “knowingly”). 
122 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 
1179, 1310 (1975) (recounting one public defender’s claim that “[a] lawyer shirks his duty when he 
does not coerce his client”). 
123 See Gabriel Hallevy, The Defense Attorney as Mediator in Plea Bargains, 9 PEPP. DISP. 
RESOL. L.J. 495, 514 (2009) (“[I]t ought to be pointed out that, while the prosecutor has the 
professional expertise necessary to arrive at a plea bargain because of operating as an experienced 
and professional advocate, the defendant has to rely on a defense attorney. The defendant does 
not, as a rule, have the tools necessary to handle the information to which he is exposed and to 
know whether that information is all the information he needs to know. In such cases, the 
defendant will probably partially or fully relinquish personal autonomy and right to self-
determination, either openly or confidentially.”). 
124 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 32, at 1153-59 (suggesting that the court adopt a regulatory 
regime that would require written plea agreements, standardized terminology in plain English, a 
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defense bar should thus take measures to protect defendants who fail to take 
advantage of favorable plea bargain opportunities due to deficient represen-
tation. I am proposing that the bar adopt a standard record that would 
document the terms of each plea offer and the defense lawyer’s assessment 
of those offers. Requiring defense counsel to do so is consistent with two 
well-known duties of defense counsel: the duty to preserve issues for appeal 
and the duty to advocate zealously on behalf of clients. Furthermore, such a 
record would serve as a mistake-proofing device that would help reduce 
many of the errors that create ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the 
first place. Although this proposed solution would add work to an overload-
ed profession, it is nevertheless worthwhile if properly framed.  
A. The Duty to Preserve Issues for Appeal 
A record of the plea bargaining process is consistent with the preexisting 
duty to preserve issues for appeal. The ABA maintains that “[d]efense 
counsel should take whatever steps are necessary to protect the defendant’s 
rights of appeal.”125 This duty generally entails raising objections at appro-
priate times in trial and meeting the procedural requirements to perfect an 
appeal.126  
In this context, the client does not lose his right to raise an ineffective 
assistance of counsel claim when he forgoes a favorable plea bargain oppor-
tunity; rather, he loses the realistic possibility of meeting the high burden of 
proof associated with such a claim because there will undoubtedly be no 
record of what transpired between him and his attorney. Unless the lawyer 
accurately recalls the events in question and speaks openly about those 
events, the failure to document the plea bargaining process effectively 
disables a client’s potential Sixth Amendment claim.127 In other words, 
 
“cooling period,” and contra proferentum review); Emily Rubin, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and 
Guilty Pleas: Toward a Paradigm of Informed Consent, 80 VA. L. REV. 1699, 1711-18 (1994) (propos-
ing a substantive legal change in which the court would presume prejudice wherever the defend-
ant’s plea bargain decision was not properly informed). 
125 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, § 4-8.2(b). 
126 See, e.g., Theus v. United States, 611 F.3d 441, 448 (8th Cir. 2010) (“Theus suffered preju-
dice as a result of his counsel’s failure to raise either in the district court or on direct appeal the 
district court’s error in imposing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a quantity of 
cocaine that required only a five-year minimum sentence.”). 
127 See, e.g., United States v. Stockton, No. 99-0352, 2012 WL 2675240, at *4 (D. Md. July 5, 
2012) (noting that the attorney’s memory of the events was “sketchy”); see also GA. ASS’N OF 
CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, IF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL REARS ITS UGLY 
HEAD, HERE’S HOW TO APPROACH IT, available at http://www.gacdl.org/zoomdocs/articles/ 
article-ineffective%20assistance%20of%20counsel.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (recommending 
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while the failure to keep a record of the plea bargaining process does not 
result in a procedural default, it has the same result. Therefore, the spirit of 
the duty to preserve issues for appeal should also compel defense lawyers to 
create an evidentiary record that their clients may need in order to prevail 
on those appeals. 
B. The Duty of Zealous Advocacy 
A record of the plea bargaining process is also consistent with a defense 
attorney’s duty to advocate zealously on behalf of his clients.128 This duty “is 
treated as a professional virtue and even as an obligation of an ethical 
attorney toward his or her client in all of the extant ethical codes.”129 In the 
plea bargaining context, this duty calls for the defense lawyer to safeguard 
the client against the attorney’s own possible biases. The justice system’s 
incentive structure threatens to bias the defense lawyer at two points. First, 
the justice system can lead lawyers to give biased advice regarding whether 
or not a defendant should accept or reject a plea bargain offer.130 For 
example, time and money concerns often encourage lawyers to push for plea 
agreements, and defense lawyers’ varying degrees of comfort in the court-
room compounds this potential bias.131 By documenting objective criteria to 
help defendants make plea decisions, a proper record would serve to protect 
clients from lawyers’ conscious or subconscious desire to push them toward 
a certain result.132 
The system also promotes defensive responses to ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims. When a lawyer is accused of incompetence by a former 
client, it is predictable that he would become defensive.133 While this may 
 
that the appellate lawyer confront trial counsel with a trial record rather than relying on the 
latter’s memory). 
128 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-19 (1980) (“The duty of a law-
yer to his client and his duty to the legal system are the same: to represent his client zealously 
within the bounds of the law.”).  
129 JOHN M. BURKOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS § 5:2 (2d ed. 2013). 
130 See Alschuler, supra note 122, at 1180 (“Today’s guilty-plea system leads even able, consci-
entious, and highly motivated lawyers to make decisions that are not really in their clients’ 
interests.”).  
131 Id. at 1182 (noting that some defense attorneys view guilty pleas as a “quick buck”). 
132 This record would also provide a basis for reviewing whether a defense lawyer was defi-
cient in encouraging a defendant to plead guilty as well. 
133 Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Confidentiality and Claims of Ineffective Assistance, 25 
CRIM. JUST. 42, 42 (2011) (“Almost every defense lawyer eventually faces an ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim from a former client . . . . A common reaction is to be defensive and view the 
former client as an adversary.”); see also Henak, supra note 90, at 348-49 (2009) (“For the lawyer 
against whom the claim is being brought, the possibility of having to handle requests for the file, 
dealing with inquiries from the prosecutor or the postconviction attorney, testifying at any 
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be a natural reaction on the part of a defense lawyer, it harms the interests 
of the defendant, who stands no chance of prevailing without the coopera-
tion of his former lawyer. It is easy to imagine that a lawyer would argue 
that his actions were part of a reasonable strategy, or that he would misrep-
resent (perhaps unconsciously) the events to make his conduct sound 
reasonable. Since even good lawyers are tempted—during plea bargaining 
and when responding to ineffective assistance of counsel claims—to act in a 
manner that is biased against their clients’ interests, the duty of zealous 
advocacy calls for lawyers to implement measures to protect their clients. A 
plea bargaining record would be a significant step in this direction. 
C. Justifying the Burden on Defense Lawyers 
The benefits of this proposed record must be weighed against its effect 
on the workload of the criminal defense bar. The extra work caused by the 
proposed record may decrease the amount of time that defense attorneys 
could spend with clients, which is a drawback that could possibly outweigh 
the benefits of implementing such a record. The Bureau of Justice Statistics 
estimated that in 2007 there were 15,000 full-time public defenders in the 
United States who were assigned over 5.5 million cases in total.134 That 
means that each defender received on average 367 cases that year, or about 
one case per day.135 Public defender systems, which are chronically under-
funded, often depend on the rapid disposition of cases in order to get 
through their tremendous case loads. As a result, the majority of these cases 
are resolved through a plea agreement after just three or fewer meetings 
between the defendant and his lawyer.136  
In order to minimize the impact on already limited public defender re-
sources, I propose a plea bargaining form that lawyers would be able to 
complete while conducting their standard investigative duties. The form 
should document the important aspects of the lawyer’s plea negotiations, 
research, and advice. For the majority of cases that are settled quickly 
through a plea bargain, the lawyer would complete only one form, which he 
could easily do while conducting the basic research that should accompany 
 
evidentiary hearings, and interacting with former clients who are now pro se, invokes an under-
standable desire to protect one’s self, and one’s professional image, within the legal community.”). 
134 LYNN LANGTON & DONALD J. FAROLE, JR., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SELECTED FINDINGS: PUBLIC DEFENDER OFFICES, 2007–STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2010). 
135 Of course, the number of cases processed by an individual defender may vary greatly from 
the average.  
136 See HARLOW, supra note 92, at 8 (reporting that over seventy percent of state inmates 
with public counsel talk to their lawyers three times or fewer before disposition of the case, most 
of which are guilty pleas). 
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any plea deal.137 If the average public defender has one case per day, this 
form’s impact should be negligible.138 It should also be noted that prosecu-
tors who conduct plea bargain negotiations with unrepresented defendants 
are already expected to create such a record.139 
Furthermore, the record would conceivably reduce the amount of time 
spent by the lawyer in ineffective assistance of counsel proceedings. With-
out such a record, a lawyer might otherwise be required to participate in 
lengthy evidentiary proceedings and write new accounts of the disputed 
conduct. The record would provide an evidentiary basis for quickly dispos-
ing of ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Given the volume of such 
claims, this reduction in workload could be quite significant. 
Finally, the criminal defense bar could adapt the proposed plea bargain-
ing record to accomplish its purpose without placing a heavy burden on 
defense lawyers. It may be that certain classes of cases present fewer 
opportunities for error or less severe consequences, and that these cases call 
for less documentation. For instance, the proposed record may be limited to 
felonies or crimes with severe collateral consequences like deportation. It is 
also possible that some plea bargains occur with such regularity that the 
record can be pre-populated with much of the required information. In 
short, once the defense bar commits to adopting a record of plea bargaining, 
it can tailor the record to its efficient uses. 
D. Documentation as Mistake-Proofing 
The proposed record would do more than simply streamline the post-
conviction review of ineffective assistance of counsel claims; the record 
would also help to standardize defense lawyers’ work by providing a 
roadmap of best practices and creating a strong disincentive for corner 
 
137 An investment in automation and data management would reduce the time required to 
compile the information requested by the form. For instance, a database of past plea agreements 
would enable the defender to quickly ascertain the going rate for a particular charge and the 
historical sentencing practices. An automated system might also flag possible collateral conse-
quences and sentencing enhancements that may apply. See Bibas, supra note 32, at 1158 (proposing 
the adoption of computer programs and checklists in order to improve defense lawyering). These 
initiatives would require some investment, but they would probably save resources in the long run. 
138 More time would be required if lawyers are not accustomed to investigating the infor-
mation needed to fill out the form. However, since the lawyer and client require the information 
requested by the form in order to make an intelligent and informed decision on whether or not to 
accept a plea bargain, the form does not add frivolous work, but rather guarantees that attorneys 
are fulfilling their basic responsibilities. 
139 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 10, at § 3-4.1(b) (“Where the defendant has properly 
waived counsel, the prosecuting attorney may engage in plea discussions with the defendant, 
although, where feasible, a record of such discussions should be made and preserved.”). 
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cutting—lawyers would know that judges might scrutinize their work later. 
The proposed record would ensure that defense lawyers investigate the 
circumstances of their clients’ cases and any potential plea offers. Further-
more, the form would help the lawyer and client weigh all of the relevant 
information before deciding whether to accept or reject an offer. It would 
juxtapose the pros and cons of a given plea offer for an easy evaluation. 
Researchers have found that similar decision aids are an effective way to 
reduce errors in the workplace.140 In short, such a record ensures that 
defense lawyers accurately research the options and consider their advice to 
their clients. Thus, the proposed record would do more than improve the 
client’s chances of ultimately prevailing on a valid Sixth Amendment claim; 
it would also help reduce the very infractions that led to those claims. 
V. ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
Apart from the record I propose, there are a number of other possible 
ways to address the evidentiary difficulty in ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims relating to plea bargains. In this Part, I evaluate two such alterna-
tives. First, I examine a procedural approach—enhancing judicial oversight 
of the plea bargaining process. Then, I evaluate a substantive option—a 
burden-shifting approach where defense lawyers would be required to prove 
effective assistance when defendants challenge particularly egregious 
decisions. I evaluate these approaches against four criteria: (1) the likelihood 
of relief to valid claims; (2) the likelihood of relief to invalid claims; (3) the 
effect on courts’ and attorneys’ workloads; and (4) the ease of implementa-
tion. I conclude that, while the other changes may help in theory, the most 
realistic hope for defendants is for criminal defense lawyers to adopt a plea 
bargaining record. 
A. Procedural Change 
The criminal justice system’s roots as an adversarial process have colored 
the way most courts approach plea bargaining. Concerned that they might 
unduly alter the balance of power, courts have tended to leave parties to 
reach an agreement by their own devices.141 However, plea bargaining need 
 
140 See Douglas M. Stewart & John R. Grout, The Human Side of Mistake-Proofing, 10 PROD. 
AND OPERATIONS MGMT. 440, 455 (2001) (describing various techniques to prevent human 
error in the workplace). 
141 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1059, 1059 (1976) (“The general consensus seems to be that trial judges should not partici-
pate in the pretrial negotiations that currently lead the overwhelming majority of American 
criminal defendants to plead guilty rather than exercise the right to trial.”).  
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not be an adversarial process; the goals of the parties may indeed align. 
Prosecutors do not necessarily strive for the harshest punishments, but 
often for results they perceive to be “good enough.”142 Similarly, defendants 
do not necessarily seek acquittal, but often quick and fair dispositions.143 A 
system predicated on a zero-sum concept of bargaining, where every benefit 
to one side equals harm to the other, therefore fails to capture the realities 
of the modern judicial system. Given the realities of our modern system, 
plea bargaining might be improved by the involvement of a third party who 
could help the prosecutor and defendant realize their aligned interests.144 
Here, I evaluate the idea of judicial review of plea bargain offers at the time 
of the colloquy or at the start of trial. 
One way to implement this concept is to require the judge to conduct a 
more searching inquiry into the plea bargaining process before allowing the 
defendant to go to trial. Yet this approach runs into an early problem. 
Although defendants would in theory be better protected if judges reviewed 
the plea bargain offers and defendants’ decisions to reject them, judges are 
traditionally discouraged from involving themselves in plea negotiations 
because of the concern that they would unduly influence the process. There 
is good reason for this concern: Judges have at times pressured defendants 
to accept plea bargain offers.145 Defendants are hesitant to go against the 
recommendation of a judge, who they see as an authority figure and who 
will preside over their trial and ultimately sentence them if they are con-
victed. And judges themselves often have a strong incentive to encourage 
plea bargains rather than trials: clearing their dockets. Thus, allowing the 
trial judge to weigh in on plea bargaining decisions may present more issues 
than it would resolve. To avoid these concerns, a separate arbiter might 
preside over the plea negotiations and conduct gateway reviews before cases 
go to trial. This person may be, but need not be, a separate judge who would 
not preside over a trial in the case that plea negotiations failed. Since the 
 
142 See HEUMANN, supra note 99, at 103 (discussing the goals of prosecutors during plea 
negotiations). 
143 See id. at 69 (discussing the goals of defense lawyers during plea negotiations and during 
trial).  
144 Though I limit this discussion to judicial oversight of plea bargaining, increased prosecu-
torial involvement with the defendant during plea negotiations may also be positive. For instance, 
plea bargaining conferences where prosecutors can present the merits of offers directly to 
defendants and dispel defense lawyers’ misunderstandings may help prevent poor decisions to 
reject offers. I do not fully consider this option here because, while potentially beneficial in 
reducing Lafler-type cases, it does not address the problem in those cases that remain—there is 
still no record of defense counsel’s advice. 
145 For an example of judicial overinvolvement in the plea bargaining process, see Louisiana v. 
Bouie, 817 So. 2d 48 (La. 2002). 
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mediator’s absence from downstream proceedings would reduce the risk of 
future bias, this arrangement would avoid the problems associated with the 
involvement of the trial judge. 
1. Likelihood of Relief on Valid Claims 
This arrangement would be an improvement over the current system in 
terms of providing relief to those defendants who bypassed a favorable plea 
deal due to bad advice from their attorneys. Mediators can readily review 
the substance of cases and plea bargain offers to determine whether the 
decision to turn down an offer made sense. When such decisions appear 
irrational, they can discuss them with the parties to ensure that defendants 
were informed of the relevant factors in their decisions. Apart from the 
ignominy of the ineffective assistance of counsel proceeding, lawyers may 
see this type of hearing as supportive rather than accusatory. Therefore, 
they may be more open about their representation. One difficulty may arise 
when decisions are predicated on confidential client information. For 
instance, a guilty defendant who knows that police are likely to find addi-
tional evidence may wish to accept a plea bargain, but the lawyer would be 
barred from disclosing this to the mediator. Nevertheless, these issues are 
less likely to arise with defendants who reject plea bargains—incriminating 
knowledge is typically a reason to accept a deal, not to reject it. Further-
more, the mediator need not inquire into all of the factors in a decision in 
order to ensure that the decision was an informed one. The mediator’s 
reiteration of the reasons why the decision appears irrational on its face 
would help to ensure that the defendant understood the costs of the deci-
sion. Thus, this solution is more likely than the current system to give relief 
to the right people.  
2. Likelihood of Relief on Invalid Claims 
This arrangement might also be effective at avoiding the inappropriate 
granting of relief on invalid claims. First, such a review would minimize 
frivolous claims because defendants have less incentive to falsely blame 
lawyers at this stage, where the trial outcome remains unknown. In other 
words, little is likely to have changed since the defendant declined the plea 
offer. By holding the hearing before the trial, parties are encouraged to seek 
the right decision, not the reversal of a bad trial result. However, there may 
remain a concern that the mediator would attempt to induce the defendant 
to accept a plea. This undue influence would be particularly dangerous if the 
mediators are judges whose dockets benefit from a system that encourages 
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plea bargains. Nevertheless, the fact that different judges would preside 
over the trials would reduce the pressure faced by defendants to comply 
with mediators’ wishes—if they decline a plea bargain, they no longer have 
to face that mediator. This issue might also be alleviated if mediators were 
selected from a pool of retired judges, civil judges, or practicing attorneys. 
3. Effect on Justice System Resources 
The biggest challenge to this arrangement is that it would add another 
step to the pretrial process, thereby creating an additional burden on the 
system. In particular, identifying, training, and paying a pool of mediators 
certainly would prove to be a costly venture. To minimize these costs, courts 
would need to tailor the new system. It would help that only those defend-
ants intending to go to trial would be required to appear before a mediator. 
Nevertheless, while far fewer defendants go to trial than plead guilty, this 
system would still result in a high case load for mediators.146 To help address 
this issue, the reviews may be limited to only the most severe cases (e.g., 
felony defendants facing over five years’ imprisonment). These cases 
constitute a small portion of the criminal proceedings but the bulk of 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.147 Therefore, this approach would 
yield a high bang for the system’s buck. Furthermore, the overhead costs 
associated with implementing this system would be at least partially offset 
by the downstream reduction in ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  
Overall, the implementation of a pre-trial hearing before a neutral me-
diator would be an effective way of addressing ineffective assistance of 
counsel in plea bargaining, and thus of protecting defendants and reducing 
frivolous claims. However, it would require significant monetary expendi-
ture and a fairly dramatic shift in the way things are currently done. The 
implementation hurdles are impossibly high—the change would require a 
massive effort on the part of court systems whose diffuse structure resists 
change. In the end, such a system is a good theoretical solution that unfor-
tunately would prove impractical given the realities of our modern judicial 
system. Therefore, the onus remains on the criminal defense bar to do what 
it can. 
 
146 For defendants pleading guilty, the same benefit may be attained by increasing the scope 
of the plea colloquy to include a substantive “fairness” review of the deal. 
147 See KING ET AL., supra note 23, at 19-20 (noting that many of the most serious cases 
result in ineffective assistance of counsel claims). 
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B. Shifting the Burden 
Another alternative solution to the problem at hand is one where de-
fense lawyers would at times bear the burden of proving that they provided 
effective assistance of counsel. As I have discussed, the high burden of proof 
placed on defendants is often responsible for defeating defendants’ claims 
because of the lack of a plea bargaining record. In order to combat this 
issue, the system could shift the burden of proof to the criminal defense 
lawyer when the decision to reject a plea bargain offer was clearly contrary 
to the best interests of the defendant. In other words, if no reasonable 
person would have made the decision under the circumstances, then the 
lawyer would have to prove that he properly informed the defendant of the 
factual and legal circumstances, leaving the court to conclude that the 
defendant was actually unreasonable and not just misinformed. 
1. Likelihood of Relief on Valid Claims 
It is clear that this proposal would benefit some defendants with valid 
claims. By shifting the burden to lawyers, the he-said/she-said problem 
would cut in favor of the defendants. Yet, although it sounds sweeping, this 
proposal may actually be underinclusive. By restricting the burden-shift to 
egregious cases, two risks are introduced. First, courts may wrongly deter-
mine that unreasonable decisions were reasonable. It may be that courts 
import an improperly low view of criminal defendants’ sophistication, such 
that objective reasonableness is determined from the perspective of a person 
of less than ordinary intelligence. The change would thus leave untouched 
some noticeably poor decisions. Second, the rule would not benefit those 
defendants whose decisions were within the range of reasonableness but still 
not the ones they would have made upon receiving proper advice. For 
example, if a plea bargain would have resulted in a two-year reduction of a 
ten-year sentence, the court may find that the decision to reject the plea was 
not egregious. But if the person only rejected it because of his counsel’s bad 
advice, his entitlement to relief is no different than one whose injury was 
more severe. It is clear that more defendants would have access to relief 
under this regime than under the current system, but the solution would be 
less effective than the proposed plea bargaining record. 
2. Likelihood of Relief on Invalid Claims 
This burden-shifting proposal also has a real risk of being overinclusive. 
It goes without saying that some defendants will make decisions regarding 
plea offers that are objectively unreasonable. In fact, the burden-shifting 
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proposal might even give such defendants a perverse incentive to unreason-
ably reject favorable plea offers and go to trial since they would later have 
an opportunity to have that decision reviewed under a relatively favorable 
standard if they are eventually convicted. On the other hand, the burden-
shifting proposal might cause lawyers to change their practices in order to 
prevent this result. The incentives are difficult to predict. Some lawyers 
may be encouraged to create a record of advice when they believe that their 
client is making an unreasonable choice. This would be appropriate for 
lawyers who want to ensure that the truth (and their performance) is 
vindicated in court. Other lawyers might find that their clients’ best inter-
ests are served by avoiding such a record. By failing to create a record, the 
lawyer could ensure that the client has the opportunity to challenge the 
decision later, thereby giving him another proverbial bite at the apple. This 
is, however, a dim and (hopefully) inaccurate view of defense lawyers. Some 
of this risk would also be allayed by the prosecutor’s expected response to 
the burden-shifting proposal. Since the prosecutor has the greatest interest 
in maintaining the conviction, he would probably adjust his practice to make 
sure that the defendant knows what is in his best interest. This may result in 
a better flow of information from prosecutor to defendant and more docu-
mentation of plea bargain offers and outcomes. 
3. Effect on Justice System Resources 
It is unclear what this proposal would do to the workload of the justice 
system. On the one hand, the rule could spur prosecutors and defense 
lawyers to document better the circumstances surrounding unreasonable 
decisions to reject favorable plea offers (for instance, where the defendant 
goes against advice of counsel). This shift would probably entail only a 
minor increase in workload, and if adopted broadly, it would prevent the 
overinclusiveness that could result in an increase of frivolous ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims. On the other hand, if defense lawyers deter-
mined it would be better to leave open the clients’ possible challenges, and 
prosecutors were unable to obtain the justification needed to defend their 
convictions, then the floodgates may be opened to frivolous claims. I 
suspect, however, that courts would guard against this result by curtailing 
the decisions found to be objectively unreasonable. In the end, I predict that 
this burden-shifting proposal would not dramatically affect the workload of 
courts or lawyers. 
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4. Likelihood of Implementation 
Finally, the likelihood of implementation of this proposal is low. Federal 
courts would only adopt this burden-shifting proposal if the Supreme Court 
mandated it. While state courts may effect the change under state law, they 
have rarely shown any motivation to take defendants’ rights beyond those 
prescribed by the Constitution. Ultimately, given the uncertain response of 
defense lawyers, prosecutors, and courts to this proposed change, and the 
unlikelihood that such a change can be effected at all, I conclude that this 
option is inferior to my proposal that the criminal defense bar adopt a plea 
bargaining record. 
VI. THE RECORD 
A. The Contents of the Record 
Having argued that the criminal defense bar should adopt a record of 
the plea bargaining process to protect defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights, 
and that other solutions are either impractical or inferior, I now propose the 
possible contents of that record. The overarching objective is to create a 
record that captures the elements of a lawyer’s investigation and advice that 
defendants often challenge in ineffective assistance of counsel claims, while 
minimizing the time required to complete it. Therefore, the record should 
consist of at least three primary sections: expected trial outcome, terms of 
the plea bargain deal, and an evaluation of options. These are the key inputs 
into the defendant’s decision to accept or reject a plea bargain deal—and 
those most needed to review a lawyer’s advice after the fact. 
The first section of the proposed form—the expected trial outcome—
should include an evaluation of known evidence and the perceived likeli-
hood of conviction on each charge. A lawyer would be able to quickly 
complete this section when the case is airtight or the defendant concedes 
guilt. It should also include the likely sentence the defendant would face 
and any possible collateral consequences. This structure would ensure that 
the defendant understands the probable outcome of a decision to turn down 
a plea and go to trial. 
The second section—the evaluation of the plea agreement—should con-
tain the charges offered by the prosecution as part of the plea offer, any 
recommended sentences that would be a part of the offer, and any collateral 
consequences that might flow from accepting the offer. These are essential 
ingredients of the offer and should be easy to determine. In this section, the 
lawyer should also document an assessment of the going rate for similarly 
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situated defendants. Here, the lawyer should attempt to identify the typical 
plea bargain that is offered to defendants in similar cases. This information 
allows the defendant to make a proper assessment of the prosecution’s offer. 
Finally, after investigating and documenting this information, the lawyer 
should advise the client as to the best course of action. He should record 
whether he advises the client to accept or reject the plea bargain offer and 
the rationale for that advice. The rationale should usually be rooted in the 
information captured on the form. For instance, if the plea bargain offer is 
superior to the likely outcome of a trial, and it compares favorably to other 
plea bargains that have been offered to defendants in similar cases, then the 
lawyer can record that information and advise the client to accept the plea 
offer. After completing the record, the lawyer should provide one copy to 
the client and should keep the other copy in his files. Due to confidentiality 
concerns, the lawyer should keep the record private until he becomes 
involved in an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.148 
B. The Courts’ Use of the Record 
As a general matter, the record should remain a confidential communica-
tion between a lawyer and his client up until the point that confidentiality is 
waived by the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. When the client 
presses his claim, he may either present the record as evidence of the 
defective advice, or argue that the record misrepresented the advice actually 
given by the lawyer. 
The court would assess the record to see whether the written analysis of 
the plea deal is defective on its face. If so, the defendant will have met his 
burden under the first Strickland prong, provided that the defect rises to the 
level of ineffectiveness. If the defect makes the advice and the resultant 
decision sufficiently suspect, then a finding of prejudice is appropriate.  
If, on the other hand, a review of the record indicates that the lawyer 
adequately investigated the circumstances and provided reasonable advice, 
then the claim is defeated. Thus, the record does nothing to change the 
Strickland analysis. Instead, it provides what should in most cases be a more 
reliable account of what actually happened, so that the court can more 
accurately decide the case. 
 
148 The lawyer must also provide the record to the client upon request. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 46 (2000) (“On request, a lawyer must allow a 
client or former client to inspect and copy any document possessed by the lawyer relating to the 
representation, unless substantial grounds exist to refuse.”). 
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C. What Happens When the Record is Inaccurate? 
When the record is inaccurate—for example, the lawyer told the client 
something different from what he wrote—it will be nearly impossible for 
the defendant to prevail. In that case, a he-said/she-said dispute would likely 
end the claim. But that is hardly a fatal flaw in this proposal: that is the fate 
of most every case in the present system anyway. So, defendants are, in the 
overwhelming majority of cases, no worse off because of the record. On the 
other hand, if the lawyer corroborates—rather than contests—the defend-
ants’ assertions that the advice differed from that recorded on the form, it 
may be slightly more difficult to convince a court that the advice was 
deficient than it would be without a contradictory record. I contend that 
these cases are likely to be extremely rare. Lawyers are unlikely to advise 
clients in a manner that contradicts the record they create to document that 
advice, and if they do so, it will be rare that they will admit it and that 
courts will fail to credit that admission. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye 
were a step forward in protecting citizens’ Sixth Amendment rights. The 
decisions represented the Court’s first overt recognition that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel is distinct from the right to a fair trial, extend-
ing to plea bargaining even when the defendant receives a fair trial. Howev-
er, the right to be informed of, and properly advised on, plea bargain offers 
is far less meaningful when its vindication depends upon counsel’s good will 
and good memory in later ineffective assistance of counsel proceedings. 
In order to secure the rights of their clients, the criminal defense bar 
should adopt a standard record of the plea bargaining process. Such a 
practice is consistent with the lawyer’s duties to preserve issues for appeal 
and to advocate zealously on behalf of her client. Further, it would provide a 
roadmap for the lawyer to ensure adequate investigation and advice and 
would discourage corner cutting. Even though the record would be addi-
tional work for defense lawyers, the bar can tailor it to minimize the impact. 
The criminal defendant is truly at the mercy of the defense lawyer, and the 
good advocate should seek to guarantee the rights of her clients.   
